On Flyvbjerg and Phronēsis

Some notes on Bent Flyvbjerg's Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and What Can Make It Succeed Again (Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Flyvbjerg begins with the fundamental problem of the social sciences vs. the natural sciences. I.e., is a true science of society possible given the variability and slipperiness of the human condition? Of course, this fundamental question goes way, way back. Flyvbjerg himself reminds us that this basic question plagues the social sciences from their origin. For example, Weber recognized the distinction between instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value rationality (Wertrationalität), a distinction that Foucault and Habermas in different ways recognized as central to their own programs.

Consider, for example, the high-modernist apotheosis of urban renewal projects. The engineering model at the core of this effort recognized a host of pathologies endemic to cities (crime, poverty, disease, etc). Since these problems seemed to reside at a large scale, the solution during the 50s and 60s was large-scale demolition of large swaths of inner cities without regard to the preferences of individual dwellers of those places. In other words, instrumental rationality viewed urban decay as a problem and presented a solution (viz., destruction and reconstruction) as the proper solution. But this perspective failed to view the particular circumstances of the particular denizens whose homes and lives were turned upside down by the process. Planners point to this period as a moment of reckoning, an occasion to reflect on if not reject in whole cloth their approach. Rather than proffering solutions from the outside, planners shifted to accommodate the perspectives of those whose lives might be touched by such projects (i.e., to accommodate value rationality).

But, as Flyvbjerg describes, this recognition of the limits of human knowledge is nothing new. Indeed, Aristotle understood that scientific knowledge (episteme) is bracketed by specific contexts; there are certain domains where this sort of understanding (and action based on it) do not obtain.

"Episteme thus concerns universals and the production of knowledge" (p. 56)

"Whereas episteme resembles our modern scientific project, techne and phronesis denote two contrasting roles of intellectual work." (p. 57)

"Episteme    Scientific knowledge. Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based on general analytical rationality. The original concept is know today from the terms "epistemology" and "epistemic"

Techne        Craft/art. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward production. Based on practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious goal. The original concept appears today in terms such as "technique," "technical," and "technology."

Phronesis    Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatics, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original concept has no analogous contemporary term." (p. 57)

Flyvbjerg explains episteme as "know why" and techne as "know how," but doesn't proffer a similar schtick for phronesis. I would suggest that it is "know when". It's also important to note that phronesis is embodied (i.e., it doesn't exist without the phronimos, or the person of practical knowledge). Phronesis is thus best thought of as the judgment about what can be done given specific circumstances rather than what is physically possible. Perhaps it is best understood as the skill of knowing what is feasible rather than possible. As an example, when is the best time to call for a vote on a bill?

Phronesis "focuses on what is variable, on that which cannot be encapsulated by universal rules, on specific cases….requires an interaction between the general and the concrete; it requires consideration, judgment, and choice." (p. 57).

Flyvbjerg's basic argument, similar to that made by other previous advocates of phronesis, is that the social sciences encounter questions such as "What should be done?" and "What is desirable?" and perhaps "Who gains and who loses?". There is no universal, scientific answer to such questions, because they are rooted in particularity both temporally and spatially.

Most importantly, Flyvbjerg offers a set of "Methodological guidelines for a reformed social science" in Chapter 9:

1. Focusing on values (p. 130-1): three questions animate the effort at steering toward value- rather than instrumental-rationality. (Where are we going? Is it desirable? What should be done?).
2. Placing power at the core of analysis (p. 131-2): Not just "who governs?" but "what "governmental rationalities" are at work by those who govern? Power is productive and positive (even though it can be restrictive and negative).
3. Getting close to reality (p. 132-3): "Phronetic researchers seek to transcend this problem of relevance by anchoring their research in the context studied and thereby ensuring a hermeneutic "fusion of horizons". This means being close to the ground (the group or phenomenon) at all stages of research.
4. Emphasizing little things (p. 133-134): focus on minutiae, work phenomenologically. "thick description".
5. Looking at practice before discourse (p. 134-5): focuses on practical activity and practical knowledge in everyday situations.
6. Studying cases and contexts (p. 135-6): cases exist in context. And the essence of those particularities is only possible in attending to those cases.
7. Asking "How?" Doing narrative (p. 136-7): quotes MacIntyre, "I can only answer the question, "What am I to do?" if I can answer the prior question "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?"
8. Joining agency and structure (p. 137-8):
9. Dialoguing with a polyphony of voices (p. 139-140):